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STUCK IN THE PIPELINE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION AND 









Between 2000 and 2010, United States citizens adopted 
over 200,000 children from other countries.1  War, poverty, and 
disease all contribute to the overwhelming number of orphaned 
children worldwide.2  In addition, as the social framework of 
America changes, the popularity of international adoption has 
grown.3  Unfortunately, with the increasing number of intercountry 
adoptions, a black market of baby selling and child trafficking has 
emerged.4  In response to the growing concern over corruption and 
                                                
* Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Journal of International & Comparative 
1 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION STATISTICS, 
http://adoption.State.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) 
(stating that from the years 2000 to 2010, United States citizens adopted 208,896 
children from foreign nations). There are two categories of countries involved in 
international adoptions: (1) sending countries, which are the children’s countries 
of origin; and (2) receiving countries, which are the countries to which the 
children are adopted; see also Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the 
Hague Convention: Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best 
Interests of Children?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 370–71 
(2007).  
2 See Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States and 
Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective 
and Efficient Solution to the Implementation of the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption or Just Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good 
Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 120 (2007) (stating that 
millions of children worldwide have become homeless and orphaned due to war, 
disease and changing governmental regimes); see also Notesong Srisopark 
Thompson, Note, Hague is Enough?: A Call For More Protective, Uniform Law 
Guiding International Adoptions, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 441, 441 (2004).  
3 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), INNOCENTI DIGEST, at 3 
(1999), available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest4e.pdf 
(acknowledging that the United States receives more foreign adoptive children 
than any other country worldwide); see also McKinney, supra note 1, at 367 
(attributing the changing demographics of Western countries to an increase in 
international adoption). 
4 See Erica Briscoe, Comment, The Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: Are Its Benefits 
Overshadowed by Its Shortcomings?, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 437, 437 
(2009) (explaining that after World War II, a drastic rise in intercountry 
adoption led to the creation of an international black market for babies); see also 
Gabriela Marguez, Comment, Transnational Adoption: The Creation and Ill 
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abuse in international adoption systems, the international 
community developed the Convention on Protection of Children 
and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague 
Convention”) in 1993.5  The Hague Convention was designed to 
provide a uniform legal framework for international adoption that 
focuses on the best interests of the children.6   
While many find the mission of the Hague Convention 
admirable,7 it is often criticized for creating unworkable 
procedures.8  Many countries that send children to the U.S. for 
adoption do not have the resources to ratify the Hague Convention 
or to enforce its policies.9  Moreover, there is little incentive for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Effects of an International Black Market Baby Trade, 21 J. JUV. L. 25,  25–26 
(2000).  
5 See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 
17th Session, including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 
[hereinafter Hague Convention] (noting that the international community 
constructed a legal framework with the Hague Convention to combat the 
exploitation of children); see also Briscoe, supra note 4, at 438 (stating that the 
adoption of the Hague Convention on May 29, 1993  expanded the general 
principles of the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)). 
6 See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 123 (explaining that the Hague Convention 
makes children a national priority); see also Gina M. Croft, Note, The Ill Effects 
of a United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 621, 629 (2005). 
7 See Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2010) (asserting 
that the Hague Convention, by offering a judicial remedy for removal in child 
abduction cases, ensures the well-being of children, and prevents a cycle of 
abduction and re-abduction); see also Stephanie Vullo, The Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Commencing a 
Proceeding in New York for the Return of a Child Abducted from a Foreign 
Nation, 14 TOURO L. REV. 199, 201–02 (1997) (providing that the Hague 
Convention’s goal is to protect children wrongfully removed, and aids courts in 
determining where the children should live). 
8 See Sara Dillon, The Missing Link: A Social Orphan Protocol to the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION 
L. REV. 39, 47 (2008) (stating that the Convention has yet to resolve the issues 
surrounding intercountry adoption); see also Merle H. Weiner, International 
Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
593, 599 (2000) (arguing that the Hague Convention is an ineffective remedy for 
child abductions).     
9 See Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Note, Barriers to the Successful Implementation 
of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 561, 572 (2005) 
(explaining that the burdensome costs of complying with the Hague Convention 
might deter non-parties from joining); see also Kelly M. Wittner, Comment, 
Curbing Child-Trafficking in Intercountry Adoptions: Will International 
Treaties and Adoption Moratoriums Accomplish the Job in Cambodia?, 12 PAC. 
RIM L & POL’Y J. 595, 625 (2003) (highlighting that many sending countries are 
developing countries, and therefore lack the financial ability to implement 
Hague Convention provisions effectively).   
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countries to sign the Hague Convention because they may face 
moratoriums from the U.S. on outgoing adoptions if they are 
unable to meet the Hague Convention standards.10  Aside from 
prohibiting future adoptions from those countries, moratoriums 
also place a hold on adoptions that are already in the pipeline.11  
Thus, American families who have adoptions that are approved, 
yet incomplete, must wait until the moratorium is lifted before they 
can unite with their adopted children.12   
This paper will analyze the Hague Convention focusing on 
the problems it has created for American adoptive parents and their 
internationally-adopted children, known as “pipeline families,” 
whose adoptions were approved before the Convention’s stringent 
provisions suspended the process.  Part I will provide a brief 
background on international adoption and explain why the Hague 
Convention was enacted.  Part II will address the standards of the 
Hague Convention as well as its effects on international adoption.  
Part III will discuss American families who had or have adoptions 
in the pipeline and their struggle to unite with their adopted 
children.  Last, Part IV will propose solutions to the pipeline 
adoption problem.  These proposals include providing U.S. 
government aid to countries attempting to execute the Hague 
Convention standards, entering into bilateral agreements with those 
countries, or implementing humanitarian parole. 
 
                                                
10 See KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 132 (2009) (showing that a 
receiving country may suspend all adoptions from a sending country that is not 
in compliance with Hague Convention guidelines or policy concerns); see also 
Annette Schmit, Note, The Hague Convention: The Problems with Accession 
and Implementation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 377 (2008). 
11 See MARY ANN LAMANNA, MARRIAGES, FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS: 
MAKING CHOICES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 249 (2009) (stating that Romania and 
Russia both placed moratoriums on intercountry adoptions); see also Rebecca 
Worthington, Note, The Road to Parentless Children is Paved with Good 
Intentions: How the Hague Convention and Recent Intercountry Adoption Rules 
are Affecting Potential Parents and the Best Interests of Children, 19 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 559, 585  (2009) (explaining that problems arise when 
countries, in trying to comply with the Hague Convention, completely shut off 
their intercountry adoption pipeline). 
12 See JEAN NELSON-ERICHSEN, INSIDE THE ADOPTION AGENCY: 
UNDERSTANDING INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN THE ERA OF THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 66 (2007) (finding that moratoriums leave prospective parents 
heartbroken); see also Andrea Poe, Government Bars American Family from 
Contacting Daughter, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES (June 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Poe, Government Bars], available at 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contacting-
daughte/ (maintaining that foreign adoption moratoriums make adoption 
difficult for American parents). 
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I. Background in International Adoption and the 
Promulgation of the Hague Convention 
 
International adoption has become increasingly popular and 
is advantageous for both sending and receiving countries.13  The 
U.S. became a prominent figure in intercountry adoption in the 
1950s when the media shed light on the thousands of impoverished 
children orphaned during the Korean War.14  Since that time, 
American families have been moved by the opportunity to help 
children who might otherwise suffer poverty-stricken lives.15  
Moreover, because many war-torn countries are too unstable or 
financially weak to support orphaned children, they benefit from 
providing orphaned children loving homes abroad.16 
Changes in the U.S. have also added to the heightened 
demand for international adoptions.17  Increased access to birth 
control, the legalization of abortion, a greater number of women in 
the workforce, and more women delaying childbirth, have all 
contributed to the decreasing number of available children for 
adoption domestically.18  Moreover, greater social acceptance of 
                                                
13 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 370–71 (holding that international adoption is 
a recent phenomenon that stemmed from various advances in worldwide 
communication and transportation). 
14 See Nicole Bartner Graff, Note, Intercountry Adoption and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: Can the Free Market in Children be Controlled, 27 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405, 405 (2000) (noting that intercountry 
adoption has been a growing industry since the 1950s); see also Wittner, supra 
note 9, at 598 (noting that intercountry adoption became popular during the 
Korean War). 
15 See Donovan M. Steltzner, Note, Intercountry Adoption: Toward a Regime 
That Recognizes the “Best Interests” of Adoptive Parents, 35 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 113, 117 (2003) (discussing how the reports of substandard living 
conditions of children living in the former Soviet Union led many American 
families to adopt from there); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 598 (noting the 
trend in American families to open their doors to children of war-torn and 
impoverished countries). 
16 See Colin Joseph Troy, Comment, Members Only: The Need for Reform in 
U.S. Intercountry Adoption Policy, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2012); 
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 598 (explaining that American families adopt 
from third world countries in order to save children from impoverished lives, 
and the fees for adopting internationally are virtually the same as adopting 
domestically). 
17 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 367 (noting that scientific and cultural 
advances have changed the landscape of domestic adoption in the United States 
and other industrialized countries); see also Troy, supra note 16, at 1527–528. 
18 See UNICEF, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the contributing factors to the 
decline of children available for domestic adoption in industrialized countries); 
see also Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for 
Reform and Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2010). 
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single parenthood has increased the number of people looking to 
adopt.19  These factors have resulted in an influx of international 
adoptions, leading to more orphaned children being adopted into 
Americans homes.20   
While international adoption presents advantages, it has 
also sparked a black market where children are bought and sold 
like property.21  Sending countries, often struggling with poverty, 
have developed systems of trading and selling children in order to 
meet the increased demand for foreign adoptions by wealthier 
receiving nations such as the U.S.22  In Vietnam, for example, field 
investigations have found forged documents and cash payments to 
birth mothers, demonstrating corrupt practices designed to release 
children into orphanages for international adoption.23  Similar 
conduct has occurred in a number of the most common sending 
countries, including China, Romania, and Guatemala.24   
In 1993, the international community promulgated the 
Hague Convention in response to growing concern over abuse and 
                                                
19 See Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the Best 
Interest of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 346 (2004); see also 
McKinney, supra note 1, at 367. 
20 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 367 (contrasting low birth rates and increasing 
demand for adoption in the U.S. with the high fertility rates of most developing 
countries); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 599. 
21 See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 14 (expressing the concern that increased 
regulations will not eliminate the black market for babies because of the high 
prices individuals are willing to pay); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 599 
(noting that an increase in intercountry adoptions has resulted in the 
victimization of children). 
22 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, at 6, available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/28455.pdf (acknowledging the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service investigative efforts to uncover irregular 
practices of private foreign adoption); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 121 
(finding that countries shift away from looking at the best interests of the 
adoptive children and instead toward awarding adoptive children to the highest 
bidding prospective parents). 
23 See Patricia J. Meier, Note, Small Commodities: How Child Traffickers 
Exploit Children and Families in Intercountry Adoption and What the United 
States Must Do to Stop Them, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 185, 190 (2008) 
(describing that Vietnam stopped accepting American adoption applications 
after U.S. field investigations found adoption irregularities); see also 
Worthington, supra note 11, at 579 (noting the serious adoption irregularities in 
Vietnam found by U.S. field investigations). 
24 See D. Marianne Blair, Wells Conference on Adoption Law: Safeguarding the 
Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 
CAP. U.L. REV. 349, 367–68, 376, 381 (2005) (enumerating various adoption 
irregularities in Guatemala, Romania, and China); see also Worthington, supra 
note 11, at 559 (listing countries, such as China, Romania, Guatemala, and 
Vietnam, that have tightened their regulations or closed their borders due to 
global scrutiny of their adoption systems). 
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corruption in the international adoption system.25  The Hague 
Convention was designed to formalize and unify existing adoption 
processes in an effort to eliminate the international child trade.26   
While the Hague Convention has brought necessary focus to the 
problems associated with international adoption, implementation 
of its standards has proven impractical.27    
 
II. Standards and Effects of the Hague Convention 
 
 The Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty that was 
ratified in 1993 by sixty-six nations.28  As of August 2012, eighty-
nine countries had ratified the Convention, and an additional two 
(Nepal and Haiti) were signatories but not parties to the treaty.29  
In 1994, the U.S. signed the Hague Convention, and became a 
member country in December 2007.30  A country is considered a 
member State once it has signed and ratified the Hague 
Convention.31  Upon ratification, member States are legally 
obligated to abide by the treaty’s terms and conditions.32  
                                                
25 See David M. Smolin, Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption: The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 451–52 (2010) (discussing the Hague Convention’s 
attempt to establish safeguards to protect children in intercountry adoption); see 
McKinney, supra note 1, at 365 (describing the development of the Hague 
Convention in response to concerns about international adoption systems and the 
lack of legal protections for parties involved in the process).  
26 See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction pmbl., 
Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 ; see also Worthington, supra note 11, at 565. 
27 See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 460 (acknowledging that the Hague Convention 
needs modification to properly address international child abductions); see also 
Melissa S. Wills, Note, Interpreting the Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile the Rights of Non-
custodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted Children, and the Underlying 
Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 423, 428–29 (2006) 
(emphasizing the difficulties of litigating under the Hague Convention). 
28 See Mark W. Fraser & Mary A. Terzian, Risk and Resilience in Child 
Development: Principles and Strategies of Practice, in CHILD WELFARE FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 
436 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2005). 
29 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, STATUS TABLE 33: 
CONVENTION ON 29 MAY 1993 ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND CO-
OPERATION IN RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2012); see also Jennifer A. Ratcliff, Comment, International Adoption: 
Improving on the 1993 Hague Convention, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 336, 340 (2010) 
(acknowledging that the Hague Convention attracted many nations and allowed 
them to address the need for international adoption regulations). 
30 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, supra note 29.  
31 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
32 See Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (establishing that a person 
can commence judicial proceedings under the Hague Convention in U.S. court); 
see also Briscoe, supra note 4, at 439. 
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However, nations are not obligated to ratify the treaty or follow its 
standards, after they have signed it.33 
Signatories to the Hague Convention have committed 
themselves to ensuring that intercountry adoptions are made in the 
best interests of the children, thereby preventing unethical adoption 
practices.34  Moreover, signatories have agreed on three main 
objectives for the treaty.35  Those objectives are to: (1) guarantee 
that the best interests of the child are served in every intercountry 
adoption; (2) design a system of cooperation between countries 
that will help prevent the abduction, sale, or trafficking of children; 
and (3) secure recognition of adoptions occurring among 
contracting countries.36   
Despite the good intentions of the Hague Convention, there 
is a debate regarding the effectiveness of the treaty.  Those in favor 
of international adoption hoped that the standards set forth by the 
Hague Convention would improve the efficiency of the adoption 
system and ensure that each adoption is the result of ethical 
practices.37  Instead, the Hague Convention has created a system 
that provides little incentive for sending countries to ratify the 
treaty, and requires resources that many sending countries do not 
have.38  As a result, the Hague Convention has slowed, and in 
some instances stopped, the flow of international adoptions.39  
                                                
33 See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 439 (indicating that signing the Hague 
Convention indicates only an intent to become a party, not an obligation to ratify 
the Convention); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that becoming 
party to the Hague Convention does not obligate a state to take further action 
toward ratification). 
34 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Jane Gross, U.S. Joins 
Overseas Adoption Overhaul Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/washington/11hague.html (reporting that 
the Hague Convention is designed to protect children and parents from unethical 
practices such as abduction). 
35 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
36 Id. 
37 See Dillon, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that adoption advocates wrongly 
believed the Hague Convention would lead to an increase in international 
adoptions); see also Jena Martin, The Good, the Bad & the Ugly? A New Way of 
Looking at the Intercountry Adoption Debate, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POLY 
173, 198 (2007) (highlighting the Hague Convention’s goal to standardize 
adoption practices among divergent nations). 
38 See Kate O’Keefe, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: The United States 
Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and Its 
Meager Effect on International Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L 1611, 
1615 (2007) (noting that compliance with Convention requirements is difficult 
to meet for countries that are unable or unwilling to invest time or resources); 
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 618. 
39 See Dillon, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that adoption advocates hoped the 
Hague Convention would encourage governments to question their reliance on 
international adoption as a method of child welfare); see also Elizabeth J. Ryan, 
Note, For the Best Interest of Children: Why the Hague Convention of 
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A. Hague Convention Standards 
 
In order to achieve its three objectives, the Hague 
Convention established a number of provisions that must be abided 
by member countries and committed to by signatories.40  First, in 
order for a child to be adopted, it must be determined through a 
number of procedural requirements that adoption is in the best 
interests of the child.41  Second, those procedural requirements 
must be enforced by a Central Authority, thus preventing the 
abduction, sale, or trafficking of any child.42  Last, Contracting 
States must recognize certification of an adoption made in 
accordance with the Convention’s standards.43 
 
1. Ensuring the Bests Interests of the Child 
 
The Hague Convention first established requirements for 
international adoptions aimed at promoting the best interests of the 
child.44  Under Article 4, an adoption will only take place if the 
State of origin can establish that the child is adoptable, the 
adoption is in the child’s best interests, the authorities putting the 
child up for adoption give their informed consent, and those 
authorities have not received any compensation for the adoption.45  
Additionally, under Article 5, the sending country is required to 
determine that adoptive parents are eligible and suitable for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Intercountry Adoption Needs to Go Further, As Evidence by Implementation in 
Romania and the United States, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 377 (2006) 
(proposing that the Hague Convention could better institute its adoption program 
by providing assistance with implementation). 
40 See Elizabeth Long, Where Are They Coming From, Where Are They Going: 
Demanding Accountability in International Adoption, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 827, 837 (2012) (denoting that the Hague Convention requires a 
number of checks before a child is eligible for international adoption). 
41 See Schmit, supra note 10, at 384–85 (stating that sending countries must 
ensure that State placement is in the best interests of the child). 
42 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
43 Id. 
44 Id; see also Worthington, supra note 11, at 566 (noting that it remains difficult 
for countries to comply with Hague Convention standards, leaving numerous 
children on the street or in orphanages).  
45 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Lisa Myers, Current Issues in 
Public Policy: Preserving the Best Interests of the World’s Children: 
Implementing the Hague Treaty on Intercountry Adoption Through Public-
Private Partnerships, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 780, 794−95 (2009) 
(elaborating on the Convention’s requirement for sending countries’ competent 
authorities within the adoptee’s country of origin to determine a child’s 
adoptability as well as the consent of the biological parents). 
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adoption, counsel adoptive parents, and ensure that the child is 
legally authorized to live in the receiving country.46   
To ensure that the guidelines aimed at the best interests of 
the child are followed, Article 6 requires that each Contracting 
State designate a Central Authority47 to enforce the duties 
established by the Convention.48  Among its many obligations, 
Article 16 requires the Central Authority to prepare a report 
detailing information about the child’s “identity, adoptability, 
background, social environment, family history, medical history 
including that of the child’s family, and any special needs of the 
child.”49  In consideration of that report, the Central Authority 
must determine whether the placement of the child with his or her 
prospective parents is in the child’s best interests.50  As a final 
safeguard of the child’s best interests, where an adoption is to take 
place after the child has been transferred to the receiving state, 
Article 21 grants the receiving state’s Central Authority the power 
to withdraw the child from the prospective parents and arrange 
temporary care if it appears that the placement is no longer in the 
child’s best interests.51 
 
2. Promoting the Objectives of the Treaty Thereby 
Preventing the Abduction, Sale, and Trafficking of 
Children 
 
Under the Convention, Central Authorities must cooperate 
with each other and promote the objectives of the treaty, including 
the prevention of corrupt adoption practices.52  In order to do so, 
                                                
46 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 131 
(elaborating on the sending country’s duties under Article 5 to ensure that 
prospective parents are eligible to adopt and the children may legally enter their 
respective receiving countries). 
47 For example, the Department of State serves as the U.S. Central Authority, the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Justice serves as Vietnam’s Central Authority, and the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China serves as China’s 
Central Authority.  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, supra 
note 29; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague 
Children’s Conventions and the Case for International Family Law in the 
United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 67 (2010) (detailing the U.S. Department of 
State’s position as the U.S. Central Authority as well as the specific office 
within the Department that performs Convention-specific duties). 
48 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Croft, supra note 6, at 631 
addressing the designation of Central Authorities as well as the cooperation 
between them to carry out the objectives of the Convention). 
49 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
50 Id.   
51 Id. If a child is so removed from the prospective parents, the Central Authority 
must arrange, without delay, a new placement of the child, or arrange alternative 
long-term care.  
52 Id. 
225 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF  [Vol. 3, No. 1 
 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
Article 7 requires Central Authorities to exchange information 
about their States’ adoption policies with other Central Authorities, 
and to collaboratively eliminate any obstacles that would prevent 
the application of the treaty.53  Additionally, under Article 8, 
Central Authorities are required to prevent any improper gains, 
financial or otherwise, with respect to adoptions, and enforce all 
the provisions in the treaty.54  However, Article 32 details some 
fees that are permissible in international adoption.55  Those fees 
include the reasonable costs and expenses of professional persons 
involved in an adoption.56  Further, in an effort to prevent wealthy 
people seeking to adopt from pressuring birth parents to release 
their children to orphanages, Article 29 prohibits contact between 
the prospective parents and birth parents of a child until the 
requirements of Articles 4 and 5 have been met.57   
 
3. Recognizing Adoptions Made in Accordance with the 
Treaty 
 
 The Hague Convention requires that all Contracting States 
recognize adoptions made in accordance with the laws of the 
treaty.58  Recognition of an adoption, according to Article 26, 
requires recognition of the legal parent-child relationship between 
the child and his or her adoptive parents, and the termination of the 
prior legal relationship between the child and his or her birth 
parents.59  Under Article 24, a Contracting State may refuse to 
recognize an adoption only if the adoption is “manifestly contrary 
to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the 
child.”60   
 
                                                
53 See id.; see also Peter H. Pfund, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights 
of the Child: Contributions of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 673 (1997). 
54 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Kristina Wilken, Note, 
Controlling Improper Financial Gain in International Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 85, 90 nn.39–44 (1995). 
55 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Holly C. Kennard, Comment, 
Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of Children: A Discussion of the Hague 
Convention in Respect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
623, 635 (1994). 
56 See Hague Convention, supra note 5; see also Smolin, supra note 25, at 178. 
57 See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stressing that there should be no contact 
between the prospective parents and the child’s birth parents until certain 
requirements are met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or the 
contact is in compliance with the conditions set forth by the State of origin); see 
also Wittner, supra note 9, at 616 nn.160–61 (depicting that birth parents to 
surrender the child, as well as to prevent improprieties from occurring). 
58 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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B. Effects of the Hague Convention 
 
The Hague Convention presents both achievements and 
problems in international adoption practice.  On one hand, the 
Hague Convention has recognized that international adoption may 
be in the best interests of children, and has shed light on the 
dangers posed by black markets and the need to reform 
international adoption processes.  However, the Hague Convention 
also poses a number of problems, including its limited application 
in a number of developing countries, and the negative effect it has 
had on adoptions that were in the pipeline at the time the treaty 
was signed.61   
 
1. Hague Convention Achievements 
 
 The Hague Convention was the first formal, international 
declaration to recognize that international adoption may be a 
positive solution for orphaned children.62  Prior to the Hague 
Convention, there was general agreement that international 
adoption should only be used as a last resort.63  For example, the 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) opposes international adoption for abandoned children 
in favor of tracing children to their families within their native 
countries.64  The problem with UNICEF’s view is that it does not 
acknowledge the trauma that children suffer while they wait for the 
                                                
61 See Trish Maksew, Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The 
Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 619, 622 (2005) (detailing how the 
United States temporarily halted adoptions from Cambodia in order to comply 
with the Convention); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 336, 344–47  
(discussing how some countries, such as Romania, lack the resources to 
implement the Convention effectively). 
62 See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human 
Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 192; see also Ratcliff, supra 
note 29, at 336, 344. 
63 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 193 (explaining that the Convention was a 
rejection of previous international agreements that favored domestic options 
over international adoptions); see also Lisa M. Katz, Comment, A Modest 
Proposal? The Convention of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 283, 303 (1995) (documenting 
that the Convention’s proposition that international adoption might take 
precedence over domestic options conflicted with prior U.N. documents). 
64 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 21, G.A. Res. 44/25, 61st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (indicating that UNICEF only 
recognizes international adoption as a solution “if the child cannot be placed in a 
foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the 
child’s country of origin”); see also Thompson, supra note 2, at 454  
(emphasizing the importance of matching children with their biological 
families). 
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results of the tracing efforts.65  Due to malnutrition and lack of 
human contact, among other things, children are at a higher risk of 
physical and psychological impairments the longer they remain in 
orphanages.66  Thus, while the Hague Convention recognizes that 
adoption by a family member is priority,67 it focuses on finding 
orphaned or abandoned children permanent families regardless of 
where they live, rather than tracing their family ties at any cost.68  
However, the Hague Convention’s encouragement of international 
adoption will theoretically allow more young children to enjoy a 
loving and stable permanent home. 
 The Hague Convention is the most significant and 
ambitious action taken with respect to the protection of children 
from the black market, and other corrupt adoption practices.69 The 
treaty provides a framework for a uniform system of international 
adoption and establishes safeguards that could potentially end child 
trafficking.70  The uniformity of adoption laws proposed by the 
Hague Convention helps to mediate the problems associated with 
the varying levels of protection for orphaned children resulting 
from disparate adoption systems.71  Moreover, the focus that the 
Hague Convention has placed on corrupt international adoption 
practices may lead to further governmental efforts to stop child 
                                                
65 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 180 (noting the inadequacies of institutions 
for orphans in regards to physical and emotional care); see also Thompson, 
supra note 2, at 454  (explaining negative effects of waiting for children’s family 
to be traced). 
66 See Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children, G.A. Res. 57/190, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/190 (Dec. 
18, 2002) (stating that centers for unaccompanied children, such as orphans, are 
not able to meet the emotional and developmental needs of children); see also 
The Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation, With the 
Best Intentions: A Study of Attitudes Towards Residential Care in Cambodia at 
20, 21 (2011), available at http://www.unicef.org/eapro/ 
Study_Attitudes_towards_RC.pdf (discussing a research study by UNICEF 
Cambodia Child Protection addressing the socio-emotional and cognitive 
development of institutionalized children).  
67 See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stating that each State should take 
appropriate measures to enable children to remain in the care of their biological 
families).  
68 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 193 (explaining the Convention’s goal to push 
for a family environment); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 342. 
69 See Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 340 (recognizing the Convention’s success 
based upon global outreach); see also Thompson, supra note 2, at 442  
(emphasizing the global impact of the Hague Convention). 
70 See Troy, supra note 16, at 1544 (arguing that adherence to the Convention’s 
standards will further the goal of stopping child trafficking). 
71 See Schmit, supra note 10, at 376–77 (establishing that differing legislation 
from country to country creates difficulties in preventing corruption in 
intercountry adoption). 
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trafficking.72  Thus, the Hague Convention has the potential to put 
an end to the problems of abuse and corruption in international 
adoption practices. 
 
2. Problems Arising from the Hague Convention 
 
While the Hague Convention has its benefits, its stringent 
provisions deter developing countries from ratifying the treaty 
because they fear adoptions from their country will be suspended, 
or they lack the resources necessary to execute its standards.  The 
Hague Convention offers little incentive for developing countries 
to ratify the treaty.73  Although ratifying the Hague Convention 
allows developing countries to signal to the world that they are 
committed to ethical intercountry adoption policies, that incentive 
is not enough for countries with struggling economies that rely on 
the lucrative child trafficking trade.74  Moreover, the U.S. 
continues to permit adoptions from countries that are not members 
of the Hague Convention, while simultaneously placing holds on 
adoptions from member countries that do not abide by the Hague 
Convention’s standards.75  This inconsistency creates a 
disincentive for developing countries to ratify the Hague 
Convention because they do not want to risk having the U.S. 
suspend adoptions.76  As a result, the Hague Convention is not 
                                                
72 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AGENCIES 
HAVE IMPROVED THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION PROCESS, BUT FURTHER 
ENHANCEMENTS ARE NEEDED 29 (2005); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 
133–34. 
73 See Kimball, supra note 9, at 564 (establishing that the economic burden of 
compliance in conjunction with underlying social and cultural opposition to 
intercountry adoption provides little incentive for ratification by major sending 
countries). 
74 See Sarah Sargent, Suspended Animation: The Implementation of the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption in the United States and Romania, 10 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 351, 358 (2004) (arguing that the economic imbalance 
between major sending countries and major receiving countries leads to 
criticism of intercountry adoption as an exploitation of developing countries); 
see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 618 (stating that little incentive exists for 
Cambodia to ratify the treaty when the child trafficking trade adds 
approximately $7.5 million per year to its economy). 
75 See Andrew C. Brown, Comment, International Adoption Law: A 
Comparative Analysis, 43 INT’L LAW 1337, 1363–364 (2009) (explaining that 
the United States discontinued adoptions from Guatemala, a member of the 
Convention, but continued adoptions from countries that are not parties to the 
Convention and have problems with fraudulent adoption practices); see also 
Schmit, supra note 10, at 377. 
76 See Schmit, supra note 10, at 377 (explaining that the Hague Convention 
punishes countries that are members to the Convention, but have yet to 
implement its standards, while rewarding non-member countries by allowing 
those countries to ignore Convention requirements). 
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being signed by the very countries where child trafficking is most 
prevalent.77   
Even when developing countries ratify the Hague 
Convention, they often lack the resources to implement its 
provisions.78  While the Hague Convention was designed to work 
with several different legal regimes, it is difficult to implement in 
countries that struggle with poverty, political discourse, or an 
inadequate police force.79  The Hague Convention places a heavy 
burden on sending countries to execute the treaty’s provisions.80  
Additionally, the Hague Convention requires each member State to 
establish a Central Authority to enforce its provisions.81  Those 
obligations are extraordinarily costly and nearly impossible for 
developing countries to implement without the help of foreign 
aid.82  Moreover, the fact that it took the U.S., a country with much 
greater political and financial resources than many of the ratifying 
countries, more than ten years to implement the Hague Convention 
is a testament to how difficult it is to comply with its standards.83   
                                                
    77 See Briscoe, supra note 4, at 451; see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 
 617. 
78 See O'Keefe, supra note 38, at 1615 (explaining that  many developing 
countries lack the funds to fully comply with the Hague Convention); see also 
Wittner, supra note 9, at 625. 
79 See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 127 (noting that some receiving countries are 
skeptical of adopting children from sending countries that are without the 
economic means to enact necessary safeguards against corrupt adoption 
practices); see also Schmit, supra note 10, at 390. 
80 See Kimball, supra note 9, at 563 (noting that the Hague Convention favors 
receiving countries who tend to be wealthier and thus able to shoulder a larger 
economic burden than the sending countries).  For example, sending countries 
are responsible for investigating birth and adoptive families, and combating 
corrupt adoption practices.  See Wittner, supra note 9, at 617. 
81 See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (delegating a Central Authority to 
implement and enforce its provisions). 
82 See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 147 (observing that the start-up costs to 
implement the Hague Convention’s provisions are impossibly high for 
developing countries); see also Katherine Sohr, Note, Difficulties Implementing 
the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption: A Criticism of the Proposed Ortega’s Law 
and an Advocacy for Moderate Adoption Reform in Guatemala, 18 PACE INTL. 
L. REV. 559, 582–83 (2006) (stating that the main problem with the Hague 
Convention’s proposed reforms is inadequate funding for developing countries 
to revamp their adoption programs). 
83 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 391 (stressing that even a country with greater 
power struggled to implement the Hague Convention regulations). The extended 
delay in U.S. ratification of the Hague Convention was caused by conflicts 
between the U.S. Department of State and American adoption experts on how to 
best implement the Convention’s standards.  Because intercountry adoption 
policies in the U.S. were regulated by state governments rather than the federal 
government prior to the Hague Convention, the U.S. had to restructure its 
adoption system before it could ratify the treaty.  See Laura Beth Daly, Note, To 
Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Need for Compliance with International 
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When a country ratifies the Hague Convention but is 
unable to implement its provisions, there is a risk that the country 
will place a hold on its outgoing adoptions.  For example, while 
Romania was one of the first countries to ratify the Hague 
Convention, corruption ensued when it attempted to improve its 
adoption system.84  Because the Romanian government was unable 
to quell the corruption, it issued a moratorium on international 
adoptions in 2001.85  Political debate over international adoption 
and inadequate financing has resulted in Romania’s inability to 
meet the standards of the Hague Convention.86  Consequently, 
Romania’s moratorium has left more than 80,000 Romanian 
children without permanent families.87   
Moratoriums imposed by the U.S. upon countries that do 
not comply with the Hague Convention also pose problems for 
those involved in international adoptions.  The U.S., as the 
receiving country of the greatest number of international adoptions 
worldwide,88 monitors the ethical standing of sending countries’ 
adoption processes.89  When the U.S. Department of State finds 
that a country has not signed the Hague Convention or is not 
meeting Hague Convention standards, it may suspend adoptions 
from that country.90  However, by banning adoptions from such 
countries, the U.S. limits its citizens’ adoption options, and 
abandons countries that have little hope of implementing the 
Hague Convention on their own.91   
                                                                                                                                                       
Norms by Guatemala and Cooperation by the United States in Order to 
Maintain Intercountry Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 620, 623 (2007).  
84 See Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 345 (expanding on Romania’s difficulties in 
implementing the Hague Convention’s requirements). 
85 Id. (noting that the Romanian government issued a temporary moratorium on 
international adoptions in 2001 in order to reform their adoption system). 
86 Id. at 345–56. 
87 Id. at 346. 
88 See UNICEF, supra note 3 (stating that the U.S. is responsible for 
approximately half of all foreign adoptions). 
89 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of State and Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Joint 
Statement on Suspension of Processing for New Adoption Cases Based on 
Abandonment in Nepal (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 
2010/08/145767.htm (stating that the U.S. Department of State investigated 
Nepal’s child abandonment reports and found them unreliable).  
90 See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 127 (noting that the U.S. refuses to participate 
in intercountry adoption proceedings with sending countries that mistreat 
orphaned children, are known for child trafficking, or have otherwise corrupt 
adoption practices); see also Gross, supra note 34 (commenting on how the U.S. 
threatened to suspend adoptions from Guatemala because of corruption claims, 
even though the country ratified the Hague Convention). 
91 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 1 (displaying the sharp decrease in U.S. 
adoptions from Guatemala); see also Schmit, supra note 10, at 391–92 
(emphasizing the effect of a U.S. ban on Guatemalan adoptions). 
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The U.S. moratorium on adoptions from Cambodia 
exemplifies some of the serious and long-term effects that a ban 
can have on international adoption.  In 2001, the U.S. placed a 
moratorium on adoptions from Cambodia because Cambodia did 
not sign the Hague Convention.92  Although Cambodia became a 
party to the Hague Convention in 2007, and ratified the treaty in 
2009, the U.S. reconfirmed its moratorium on Cambodia in 2009 
because of concerns that Cambodia was not properly implementing 
the standards of the Hague Convention.93  Since the ban, mortality 
among children in Cambodia has steadily risen.94  Further, because 
Cambodia has a law prohibiting the adoption of children over the 
age of eight years old, there is a growing concern that the 
continuing moratorium will cause many orphaned children to lose 
the opportunity to ever have a permanent family, merely because 
of their age.95 By banning adoptions from a country attempting to 
satisfy Hague Convention standards, the U.S. ignores the 
underlying problems causing that country to fall short of the 
treaty’s standards.  Moreover, the bans severely impact orphaned 
children who will remain without permanent families indefinitely 
or until the U.S. is satisfied that the country has complied with the 
Hague Convention.   
 
III. Pipeline Families and The Efforts to Complete Their 
Adoptions 
 
The adoption moratoriums on countries that are unwilling 
or unable to implement the Hague Convention standards have 
created a problem for adoptions that were approved yet incomplete 
prior to when the bans were placed.96  The adoptive parents and 
                                                
92 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, INS Announces Suspension of 
Cambodian Adoptions and Offer of Parole in Certain Pending Cases (Dec. 21, 
2001) (announcing the United States’ immediate suspension of Cambodian 
adoption petitions); see also Wittner, supra note 9, at 619 (recounting the United 
States’ imposition of a ban on Cambodian adoptions as a method for preventing 
intercountry adoption fraud). 
93 See CONGRESSIONAL COALITION ON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, COUNTRY UPDATE: 
CAMBODIA, http://www.ccainstitute.org/country-update-cambodia.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2012).  The Cambodian government continues to make efforts 
to better its adoption system and expects, with U.S. recognition, to receive 
adoption proposals in April 2012.   
94 See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF), CAMBODIA STATISTICS, 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/cambodia_statistics.html (last visited Sept. 
18, 2012) (showing an increase in the mortality rates of children under the age 
of five in Cambodia from 2000 to 2010). 
95 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 451 (assessing how some children have lost 
their chance to be adopted because they have turned eight years old). 
96 See Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (critiquing the Hague Convention’s 
failure to consider the effects of compliance on pending adoptions); see also 
Mireya Navarro, To Adopt, Please Press Hold, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, 
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children in those situations, known as “pipeline families,” have 
been forced to put their adoptions on hold, while the Contracting 
States determine what additional guidelines must be met before the 
adoptions can be completed.97  The delay in these adoptions has 
created a number of problems, including the deterioration of the 
mental and physical health of the adopted children as they continue 
to live in orphanages or foster homes.98 
While countries attempt to understand the steps the Hague 
Convention requires them to take in order to complete these 
adoptions in the pipeline, the adopted children are left to live in 
orphanages with little to no contact with their adoptive families.99  
During this time, adoptive parents have banded together to form 
support groups, file petitions, and coordinate marches in hopes of 
persuading the U.S. government to remedy their tragic 
situations.100  Unfortunately, the U.S. government has provided 
little insight into how pipeline adoptions can be completed, leaving 
these families to wonder if they will ever be united with their 
adopted children.101   
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/fashion/05adopt.html (revealing the effects 
of tightened U.S. regulations on American adoptive parents seeking to adopt 
children in Guatemala and Vietnam). 
97 See Andrea Poe, Step Forward for Orphans March: American Families to 
Protest U.S. Policies, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, Aug. 15, 2011, 
[hereinafter Poe, Step Forward], http://communities.washingtontimes.com/ 
neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-family-forum/2011/aug/15/separated-their-
children-us-policies-american-fami/ (announcing that pipeline families are 
staging marches to urge the U.S. government to finalize adoption policies that 
remain in a state of uncertainty). 
98 See Andrea Poe, Happy Endings: America[n] Family Nick and Lori LeRoy 
Fight Bureaucracy to Bring their Son Home, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, 
Apr. 23, 2012, [hereinafter Poe, Happy Endings], 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2012/apr/23/america-family-fight-bureaucracy-bring-their-son-h/ 
(stating that the working orphanage in the Vietnamese Bac Lieu province is a 
former prison camp with minimal medical and educational supplies). 
99 See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98. 
100 See Bring Home the Bac Lieu Orphans, PETITION2CONGRESS, 
http://www.petition2congress.com/4665/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) 
(petitioning Congress for help to unite pipeline parents with their adopted 
children from Vietnam); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (explaining 
that pipeline parents  have coordinated a march on Washington, D.C. to raise 
awareness for their cause).  
101 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUATEMALA UPDATE, http://adoption.state.gov/ 
country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type=not
ices&alert_notice_file=guatemala_9 (last visited October 31, 2012) (indicating 
that some American adoption cases pending in Guatemala were closed between 
2011 and 2012 after the children were reunited with their biological parents or 
placed in domestic adoption); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 
(illustrating that even if Vietnam ratifies the Hague Convention, its Central 
Authority may match children with different adoptive parents and thus preclude 
pipeline parents from uniting with their children). 
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A. The Plight of Pipeline Families   
 
There are hundreds of U.S. families who are caught in 
limbo as intercountry adoption regulations shift to comply with the 
Hague Convention.102  In those cases, prospective parents were 
matched with specific children, and have waited as long as three 
years to bring their children to the U.S.103  In many cases, the 
adoptive parents have met with their adopted children and spent 
quality time with them before their adoptions were completed.104  
Prior to their adoptions being put on hold, pipeline parents 
provided their adopted children with “medical care, emotional 
support, toys, books, and clothing” while the children lived in their 
countries of origin.105  After the hold, the U.S. Department of State 
stopped many of those families from visiting, writing, and calling 
their children.106  Moreover, living alone in these orphanages puts 
pipeline children at an increased risk of damage to their cognitive, 
                                                
102 See Nacha Cattan, Guatemala to Renew Adoptions Halted Midway by Ban, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 22, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/guatemala-renew-
adoptions-halted-midway-ban-223337120.html  (stating that there are currently 
an estimated 400 pipeline cases in Guatemala alone).   
103 See Mary McCarty, Area Family Caught in International Adoption Dispute, 
 DAYTON DAILY NEWS, May 28, 2011, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/ 
news/local/area-family-caught-in-international-adoption-dispu/nMrsS/ (telling 
the  
story of a family that has been waiting over two years to adopt due to their 
pipeline  
status); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (arguing that due to 
intercountry 
 adoption administrative procedures, many children are placed in orphanages for 
long 
 periods as their adoptions are processed). 
104 See Steve Freiss, 40 U.S. Families Allowed to Adopt Cambodian Kids, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 31, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news /healthscience/health/ 
child/2002-04-01-cambodia-adoption.htm (stating that many prospective parents 
have moved to their child’s country of origin to stay with them while their 
adoption is processed); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (reporting 
on a family from Florida who spent years in Vietnam with their child before 
they could bring him to the United States). 
105 See Poe, Rubio Blocks Obama’s Nominee for Vietnamese Ambassador, 
WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, May 23, 2011, [hereinafter Poe, Rubio Blocks], 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2011/may/23/rubio-blocks-obama-nominee-vietnam-ambassador/ 
(stating that prior to Senator Marco Rubio’s temporary hold on President 
Obama’s nominee for ambassador to Vietnam, prospective parents provided 
their child with many of the basic necessities of life while the child was in 
Vietnam).  
106 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (addressing the fact that many 
families who continuously contacted their Vietnamese child have lost virtually 
all contact with their child). 
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social, and physical well-beings.107  Thus, the longer these children 
live in orphanages, the more difficult it will be for them to 
assimilate into their new homes when, or if, they are permitted to 
live with their adoptive families in the U.S.108  
The Hague Convention does not provide any procedure for 
resolving the problems created for adoptions in the pipeline when 
moratoriums are placed on countries struggling to comply with the 
treaty’s standards.109  Consequently, in countries where 
moratoriums have been placed, there is little direction for pipeline 
families who wait for a governmental solution to their problem.110  
In most of these cases, pipeline parents already have paperwork 
indicating DNA matches between the pipeline children and their 
birth mothers, and relinquishment of the birth mothers’ rights to 
their children.111  Yet, as pipeline children’s countries of origin 
attempt to comply with Hague Convention standards, pipeline 
parents are forced to jump through more hoops.112  Despite their 
willingness to comply with the adoption regulations of both 
contracting countries, pipeline parents are still prohibited from 
bringing their children to the U.S.  
 
                                                
107 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, IMPACT OF ADOPTION ON 
ADOPTIVE PARENTS, http://www.childwelfare.gov/ pubs/factsheets/ impact_ 
parent/index.cfm (last visited Sep. 20, 2012) (emphasizing that adoptive parents 
should be weary of the impact on the child’s psyche from their stay in an 
orphanage and their life with their biological parents); see also Nepal Adoptions, 
HOPE’S PROMISE, http://www.hopespromise.com/adoption/international/nepal-
adoptions/ (last visited Sep. 25, 2012) (arguing that institutionalization of a child 
early in their life puts them at an increased risk of psychological disorders). 
108 See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107 (arguing that adopted children waiting 
in orphanages need to be brought to America as soon as possible because early 
intervention is the key to treating any psychological problems these child may 
have); see also Dr. Ronald S. Federici, Psy.D., Raising the Post-Institutionalized 
Child: Risks, Challenges and Innovative Treatment, CARE FOR CHILDREN INT’L, 
http://www.drfederici.com/raising_child.htm (last visited Sep. 20, 2012) (stating 
that the longer the prospective child has been institutionalized, the more he has 
been deprived from invaluable social interactions). 
109 See Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (suggesting that even though there are 
no alternative procedures in place, there are solutions preferable to a complete 
termination of intercountry adoptions). 
110 See Nancy Bartley, Parents Caught in Adoption Dispute, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/ 
2013818275_adopt01m.html; see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97. 
111 See O'Keefe, supra note 38, at 1619–624 (discussing the role DNA samples 
and statements of relinquishment play in preventing the trafficking of children); 
see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105. 
112 See Nok-Noi Ricker, Orrington Family Fights to Bring Nepalese Child 
Home, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2010, http://bangordailynews.com/ 
2010/12/24/news/bangor/orrington-family-fights-to-bring-nepalese-child-home/ 
(stating that the U.S. Department of State requires more from pipeline parents 
adopting from Nepal despite the State Department’s finding that there was no 
fraud involved with their adoptions). 
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B. Case Studies:  Pipeline Adoptions from Vietnam and 
Nepal 
 
While developing countries struggle to meet the standards 
of the Hague Convention, pipeline children continue to live in sub-
standard conditions, without adequate food, medical attention, 
education, or caring adult interaction.113  At the same time, 
pipeline parents grapple with shifting adoption requirements in the 
children’s countries of origin as they strive to bring their children 
home to the U.S.114  Analyses of the pipeline adoptions in Vietnam 
and Nepal demonstrate the hardships faced by pipeline parents and 
children during the tumultuous process of international adoption in 




In 2008, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments jointly 
banned adoptions from Vietnam to the U.S. based on allegations of 
fraud and corruption in Vietnam’s adoption system.115  As a result, 
hundreds of adoptions between American families and orphaned 
children in Vietnam were halted.116  As of 2008, most of the 534 
outstanding adoptions have been resolved under exceptions to the 
moratorium, yet sixteen cases remained, allegedly because of 
mistakes made by an adoption worker in Vietnam,117 until January 
2012.118 
                                                
113 See Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (remarking that these squalid  
conditions cause  pipeline children to suffer from severe illnesses which  
often result in hospitalization); see also Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107 
 (reiterating the deplorable conditions pipeline children are forced to live in and 
the negative effects it has on their development). 
114 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NOTICE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO 
DELAY RESUMING ADOPTIONS IN VIETNAM, http://adoption.state.gov/country 
_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.php?alert_notice_type=notices&al
ert_notice_file=vietnam_4 (last visited Sep. 18, 2012) (stating that adoptions 
between the United States and Vietnam would continue to be on hold until 
Vietnam fully complied with the provisions of the Hague Convention).  See Poe, 
Step Forward, supra note 97 (declaring a lack of urgency in the drafting of 
acceptable adoption laws and procedures has exacerbated the wait time for 
parents, and has kept families separated for years at a time).  
115 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VIETNAM, http://adoption.State.gov/ 
countryinformation/country_specific_info.php?country-select=vietnam (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2012) (stating that adoptions between the United States and 
Vietnam have been halted in the wake of alleged concerns arising out of 
Vietnam).  
116 See E. J. Graff, Anatomy Of An Adoption Crisis, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept. 12, 
2010,  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles /2010/09/07/anatomy_ 
of_an_adoption_crisis (describing American families being stonewalled by 
politicians and disallowed from concluding their adoptions). 
117 See Chris Glorioso, Orphans in Limbo as Vietnamese Adoptions Stall, NBC 
NEW YORK, July 16, 2011, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Orphans-in-
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The pipeline parents of the sixteen remaining cases waited 
for three years to bring their adopted children home to the U.S., 
while the pipeline children remained in an orphanage in the Bac 
Lieu province.119  In the orphanage, which was previously used as 
a prison, the children ate, slept, and bathed in a single room.120  
Paint peeled on the orphanage walls, and ants covered the floors, 
leaving the children with bites and welts.121  The poor sanitary 
conditions in the orphanage led most of the children to contract 
pneumonia and many to be hospitalized.122  Moreover, one 
pipeline parent explained that the children were “starved for love,” 
and “the minute an adult comes into the room, they swarm . . . to 
be held and touched.”123  Meanwhile, in the U.S., suffering 
pipeline parents did not give up hope that their children would one 
day sleep in the nurseries they prepared, and wear the clothes that 
were purchased for them.124   
Before these pipeline adoptions were halted, many pipeline 
parents visited their adopted children in the Bac Lieu orphanage 
                                                                                                                                                       
Limbo-as-Vietnamese-Adoptions-Stall--125674053.html (detailing the events 
that led to the ‘Bac Lieu Sixteen’).  
118 See Kelly Ensslin, Fixing the International Adoption Mess, GLOBALPOST, 
May 20, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-
blogs/commentary/fixing-the-international-adoption-mess (adding that eleven of 
the sixteen Bac Lieu children were able to go home to their American families 
by January 2012); see also Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (interviewing a 
set of adoptive parents who were not able to bring their son home until January 
2012 amid growing pressure on the Vietnamese government).  
119 See Rah Bickley & John O’Brien, Waiting For Their Families, THE HERALD 
SUN, July 26, 2011, http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/14836738/ 
article-July-26 (affirming that sixteen toddlers were held behind in the Bac Lieu 
province); see also Margie Mason, 16 Vietnamese Kids, US Families in 
Adoption Limbo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/ 
html/nationworld/2015321480_apasvietnamorphansinlimbo.html (explaining 
that issues with paperwork delayed the children in Bac Lieu from being united 
with their adoptive parents in the United States).  
120 See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (describing the orphanage as terribly 
underfunded with minimal educational and health supplies); see also Poe, 
Government Bars supra note 12 (detailing the dilapidated conditions at the 
orphanage). 
121 See Ensslin, supra note 118 (commenting that many of the children suffered 
from decayed teeth and various skin ailments due to the conditions in the 
orphanage); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (explaining that the 
orphanage was infested with insects).   
122 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (describing the inadequate health 
conditions at the Bac Lieu orphanage). 
123 See David Markiewicz, An Orphan’s Odyssey; ‘When Am I Coming to 
America?’, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, April 30, 2006, at 1A 
(illustrating how quickly a strong bond develops between orphans and adults 
they see as parental figures); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 
(analyzing the interaction between orphans and adults). 
124 See Mason, supra note 119 (explaining how the consequences from delays in 
adoption are felt and embodied within the adoptive parents’ homes). 
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while they waited for their adoptions to go through.125  One couple 
visited their daughter nine times in failed attempts to bring her 
home.126  Another father, who expected imminent finalization of 
his daughter’s adoption documents, stayed with his daughter for 
two months before returning to the U.S. without her.127  In that 
case, the father soon learned that the Vietnamese government 
found his family’s adoption packet incomplete, despite approval 
from the U.S. government.128  In December 2010, the U.S. 
Embassy told the sixteen pipeline families to cease all contact with 
their children until Vietnam signed the Hague Convention, and 
explained that contact during that time would be detrimental to 
their cases.129   
Ironically, the pipeline father described above met all of the 
Hague Convention’s standards.130 For example, even though DNA 
testing was not required when he first filed his adoption papers, he 
obtained DNA confirmation of his adopted child’s birth mother 
after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
issued its new DNA regulations.131  Moreover, he obtained records 
that indicate the birth mother’s relinquishment of her parental 
rights to the child, and her approval of the adoption by his 
American family.132  Despite following all of the old and new 
adoption rules in both the U.S. and Vietnam,133 his pipeline 
adoption remained in limbo for three years.134   
                                                
125 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (detailing the amount of contact 
pipeline parents had with their children while their adoptions were put on hold). 
126 See Mason, supra note 119. 
127 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (describing how the international 
adoption process can be longer and more difficult than anticipated by parents).  
128 Id. (noting that the United States signed off on the particular adoption but the 
Vietnamese government failed to do so); see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 
105 (describing the changing regulations in both States as hindering attempts by 
the adoptive parents to bring their adoptive children to the United States). 
129 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., USCIS Unable to Resume Processing Adoptions from Vietnam 
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author) (noting that USCIS announced that they 
would not resume new adoption cases until Vietnam acceded to and complied 
with the Hague Adoption Convention); see also Poe, Government Bars, supra 
note 12 (noting the U.S. embassy’s declaration that adoptive parents should 
cease contact with their adoptive children and orphanages).  
130 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (noting that the pipeline father met 
all of the major criteria established in the Hague Convention); see also Poe, 
Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (describing the hurdles adoptive parents had to 
navigate even after complying with all treaty regulations). 
131 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 129.  
132 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12.  
133 Id.  
134 See Angela Ganote, Families Bring Vietnamese Orphans Home Following 
Three Year Fight, FOX 59 NEWS, http://www.fox59.com/news/wxin-families-
bring-vietnamese-orphans-home-following-three-year-fight-
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Fortunately, in January 2012, eleven of the sixteen Bac 
Lieu children were united with their families in the U.S.135  While 
Vietnam ratified the Hague Convention on November 1, 2011, the 
treaty was not entered into force until February 1, 2012.136  The 
united pipeline families are thrilled to finally have their adopted 
children home in the U.S., yet they remain concerned about the 
children who are still being denied the right to join their adoptive 
parents in the U.S.137  Moreover, the three years that the pipeline 
children waited in the orphanage has taken its toll.  For example, 
one pipeline child’s teeth rotted out at the orphanage, requiring 
extensive dental work costing more than $6,000 when he was 
united with his pipeline family in the U.S.138  While most of the 
Bac Lieu children were finally united with their adoptive parents in 
the U.S., the U.S. Department of State announced on February 2, 
2012 that it will not resume intercountry adoptions with Vietnam 
because Vietnam allegedly has not met its obligations under the 
treaty.139  Thus, the future of intercountry adoption between the 




Unlike the ban on international adoption in Vietnam, the 
U.S. Department of State is solely responsible for the moratorium 
on adoptions from Nepal.140  In August 2010, the U.S. Department 
of State and USCIS suspended all new adoption cases involving 
children who were reported abandoned based on a finding that 
Nepalese adoption documents were unreliable.141  As a result, 
                                                                                                                                                       
20111228,0,4828110.column (detailing the three year struggle to receive their 
adopted child). 
137 See Ensslin, supra note 118. 
139 Id. 
140 See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98. 
141 Sharon Vanepps, After a Three-year Fight, an Indiana Family Finally Brings 
Home Their Son from Vietnam, WHATEVER THINGS ARE TRUE: THE GOOD, THE 
BAD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL IN THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION (Apr. 
24, 2012), http://whateverthingsaretrue.typepad.com/whatever 
_things_are_true_/2012/04/after-a-three-year-fight-an-indiana-family-finally-
brings-home-their-son-from-vietnam.html. 
142 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., USCIS Unable to Resume Processing Adoptions from Vietnam 
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author). 
140 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., U.S. Suspends Processing New Nepal Adoption Cases Based on 
Abandonment (Aug. 6, 2010) (on file with author). 
141 Id. (explaining that the Department of Justice and Unites States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services stopped processing adoptions due to the lack of 
documentation that the children were actually abandoned); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Joint Statement on 
Suspension of Processing for New Adoption Cases Based on Abandonment in 
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approximately 80 pipeline adoptions were halted, 54 of which 
remain unresolved.142 
Despite the fact that USCIS investigators found no 
evidence of fraud in the 54 pipeline adoptions, USCIS is requiring 
pipeline parents to prove that their adopted children were not 
abandoned before they can obtain visas.143  USCIS officials claim 
that the heightened requirements ensure that pipeline children were 
not forcefully removed from their biological families.144  However, 
critics argue that the requirements are impossible to meet, given 
the poor record-keeping and absence of a birth certificate system in 
Nepal.145  Given that the USCIS has not found fraud with respect 
to these adoptions, pipeline families argue that they should be 
granted visas for their children to be brought home to the U.S.146  
However, the State Department continues to require pipeline 
parents to prove the absence of fraud, opting for a ‘guilty until 
proven innocent’ burden of proof regarding the abandonment 
status of pipeline children.147   
The new regulations for pipeline adoptions in Nepal are 
financially strenuous on pipeline parents.  In order to prove the 
absence of fraud, pipeline parents are required to a hire a private 
investigator in Nepal and an attorney in the U.S., costing 
approximately $10,000.148  As a result, at least one pipeline family 
                                                                                                                                                       
Nepal (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/-
145767.html (indicating that a great deal of documents are fabricated, while 
other documents are completely unavailable). 
142 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 141; see also Bartley, supra note 110.  
143 See Bartley, supra note 110 (noting that visas will be granted contingent on 
proof that the child was actually abandoned); see also David Crary, Despite 
Hurdles, Families Pursue Nepal Adoptions, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 
2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/22/despite-hurdles-families-
_n_812618.html (stating that adoptions were suspended because officials 
discovered that some of the children being adopted were not orphans).    
144 See Bartley, supra note 110 (explaining that the reason behind proof of 
abandonment is to avoid situations where biological parents are still looking for 
their children).  
145 John R. Crook, United States Suspends Processing of Adoptions of 
Abandoned Children From Nepal, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 661 (2010) 
(explaining that among the documents needed to prove that a child is not 
abandoned are a birth certificate, and orphanage and police records); see also 
Bartley, supra note 110. 
146 See Bartley, supra note 110 (indicating that no other requirement should be 
needed where no evidence of fraud is found). 
147 See Habiba Nosheen & Lisa Desa, Nepal: Adoption Limbo, 
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nepal-adoption-orphanage-children-legitimacy 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (stating that families had to provide ample proof that 
their children were not trafficked and their adoptions were not fraudulent).  
148 See Ricker, supra note 112 (uncovering the high costs of hiring a private 
investigator and attorney for the adoption process); see also Crary, supra note 
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is selling their house in order to bring their daughter home from 
Nepal.149  Other pipeline parents have taken out loans, or asked 
their family and friends for donations.150  Some parents risk their 
careers and incomes while they visit Nepal for various lengths of 
time.151     
While pipeline parents are allowed to contact or even live 
with their adopted children in Nepal, those privileges raise a 
number of concerns, particularly when the family is unable to live 
with their child.  Pipeline parents that are able to live with their 
children in Nepal must give up their lives for an indefinite period 
of time.152  They sacrifice their jobs, and time with their families 
and friends in the U.S., yet they take comfort in knowing that their 
adopted children are safe.153  On the other hand, many pipeline 
parents do not have the option of leaving their careers and families 
in the U.S. to live abroad, and therefore, must remain separated 
from their adopted children.154  The children of pipeline parents 
who do not live with them continue to live in orphanages,155 which 
experts say can cause psychological and physical damage to the 
children.156  Orphanages struggle to provide the children with their 
basic needs, including nutritious diets and medical attention.157  
Furthermore, the orphanages are kept cold,158 made only worse by 
a short supply of clothing and blankets for the children.159  Not 
                                                                                                                                                       
143 (recognizing the high financial costs that families have had to pay in order 
to complete the adoption process). 
149 See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107; see also Crary, supra note 143 (noting 
that one family had to sell their condominium to defray the high costs of the 
adoption process). 
150 See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107. 
151 See Monica Brady-Myerof, Revere Women Questions Frustrating Nepalese 
Adoption, Fraud Claims, 90.9 WBUR, May 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/-11/nepaladoption-2 (explaining that one parent 
had to take unpaid leave to go to Nepal and subsequently lost her job when she 
returned to the United States); see also Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107. 
152 See Bartley, supra note 110.   
153 Id. (stating that pipeline parents who remain in Nepal risk their retirement 
savings and homes, because they consider the security of their children more 
important).  
154 Id. 
155 Id. (illustrating the worries of parents who had to return to the U.S. and leave 
their children behind). 
156 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 124 (emphasizing that the longer children 
spend in orphanages, the less chance they have at normal development).  
157 See Crary, supra note 143.   
158 See Bartley, supra note 110 (highlighting the fact that the orphanages are 
cold and the children often do not have enough clothing and blankets to keep 
warm). 
159 See Krithika Varagur, On Poverty and Beauty at a Nepal Orphanage, 
SENTINEL, May 5, 2010, http://medm.gmnews.com/news/2010-05-
05/Front_Page/On_poverty_and_beauty_at_a_Nepal_orphanage.html 
(describing how six Nepali orphans had to share three sets of clothing). 
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only do pipeline families struggle with the knowledge that their 
adopted children are living in an orphanage,160 but they must also 
share their heartache every time their visits end.161  Regardless of 
whether the pipeline parents live in Nepal or the U.S., every family 
struggles with the fact that they cannot begin their new lives 
together in the U.S.162  
 
C. Steps to Remedy the Problem 
 
 Because the halting of pipeline adoptions stems from 
countries imposing the new Hague Convention standards, little has 
been done to rectify the issue.163  The pipeline adoption problem is 
one of governmental regulation,164 and thus, parents can only 
petition the government for help to bring their children home.165  
While the pleas of the pipeline families for governmental action 
have not gone completely unheard,166 the U.S. government has 
failed to rectify the situation.167  Despite the efforts of some 
politicians to take action, their efforts have been mostly futile.168   
 
 
                                                
160 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 165. 
161 See Bartley, supra note 110 (quoting a parent who discussed the heartbreak a 
child would feel if her was not finalized). 
162 See Monica Brady-Myerov, Revere Woman Questions Frustrating Nepalese 
Adoption, Fraud Claims, 90.9 WBUR, May 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/-11/nepaladoption-2 (explaining the struggle of 
one pipeline parent who was forced to leave her job and take out a home equity 
line of credit when she moved to Nepal for five months in order to bring her 
adopted daughter to the United States). 
163 See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 141.  
164 See Bartholet, supra note 62, at 167 (indicating that in order to complete an 
international adoption, parents must comply with all United States federal, state, 
and sending country’s laws). 
165 See Monica Brady-Myerov, Stuck in Nepal: Local Woman in Adoption 
Nightmare, 90.9 WBUR, Oct. 8, 2010, available at http://www.wbur.org/ 
2010/10/08/nepal-adoption (indicating that there is little parents can do to 
combat the moratorium placed by the United States). 
166 See Crownover, supra note 163 (detailing the contact between a pipeline 
family and several U.S. congresspersons). 
167 See Bartley, supra note 110; see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 
(opining that a lack of governmental urgency has exacerbated the struggles of 
pipeline families). 
168 Compare Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (explaining that Senators Rubio 
and Lugar attempted to block the appointment of an ambassador to Vietnam in 
an effort to secure information about the status of assistance to pipeline 
families), with U.S. Dep’t of State, Biography of David Shear, EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN HANOI, VIETNAM, http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/ 
ambassador.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (noting that the ambassador to 
Vietnam was appointed on August 4, 2011). 
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1. Steps Taken by Pipeline Parents 
 
 Pipeline parents have used several mechanisms to bring the 
U.S. government’s attention to the pipeline adoption problem.  For 
example, the pipeline parents of children in Vietnam petitioned 
Congress, asking for help from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
and the Prime Minister of Vietnam to explore solutions for the 
speedy resolution of pipeline adoptions.169  The pipeline parents of 
children in Nepal have also started a petition to Congress, 
requesting that members of Congress continue to urge the U.S. 
Department of State and USCIS to resolve the pipeline adoptions 
in Nepal immediately.170  Moreover, these families have submitted 
hundreds of letters directly to President Obama, asking for his 
intervention to help bring their children home quickly and 
safely.171 
 Many Americans argue that the pipeline adoption issue is 
not getting necessary media coverage.  Internet blogs, such as “Red 
Thread: An Adoptive Family Forum,” are filled with comments 
from pipeline parents and their supporters who are outraged by the 
lack of media and governmental support for pipeline families.172  
One pipeline mother commented that it is a “tragedy that [the U.S.] 
government does not see the urgency in getting these children 
home with their waiting families.173  Another pipeline parent 
questioned what it will take to reform international adoption, and 
thanked those on the Red Thread blog for bringing awareness to 
her cause.174  Most bloggers demand to know where the television 
                                                
169 See Petition2Congress, supra note 100 (showing that, as of October 
2012, over 13,500 letters and emails were sent to the U.S. Congress as a result 
of the petition). 
170 See Petition2Congress, Your Continued Support for the Eighty Nepal 
Pipeline Families, http://www.petition2congress.com/3710/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2012) (showing that, as of October 2012, over 2,100 letters and emails were sent 
to the U.S. Congress as a result of the petition). 
171 See Nepal Adoptions, supra note 107; see also Crary, supra note 143 
(chronicling the efforts of pipeline families to bring their adopted children to the 
U.S., including petitioning President Obama). 
172 See RED THREAD: AN ADOPTIVE FAMILY FORUM, 
http://communities.washingtontimes.-com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (displaying a collection of stories on 
the plight of pipeline families). 
173 See Powerofonepk, Comment to Government Bars American Family from 
Contacting Daughter, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contacting-
daughte/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (commenting, from personal experience, 
on the government’s inaction as adoptive child sat in an institution in Nepal). 
174 See Experts Respond To ‘The Baby Business,’ THE SCHUSTER INSTITUTE FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www.brandeis.edu/investigate/adoption/ 
expertsrespond_PEAR.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (providing eight 
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coverage is for the plight of pipeline families, with the expectation 
that if politicians were aware of the pipeline adoption problems, 
attempts would be made to resolve it.175   
 In August 2011, in an attempt to bring national coverage to 
the pipeline adoption problem, pipeline families scheduled a march 
in Washington, D.C., called the “Step Forward for Orphans 
March,” to implore the U.S. government to address the critical 
situation affecting orphans worldwide.176  Unfortunately, due to 
Hurricane Irene, the march was postponed until December 2011.177  
At the march, pipeline families were expected to join leaders in the 
international adoption community and children’s aid organizations 
with a mission to reform the international adoption system.178  
Pipeline parents understand that officials at the U.S. Department of 
State have the power to expedite the completion of pipeline 
                                                                                                                                                       
suggestions to alleviate concerns of corruption and to reform international 
adoption); see also Lori Lu Green LeRoy, Comment to Step Forward for 
Orphans March: American Families to Protest U.S. Policies, THE WASH. TIMES 
COMMUNITIES, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-
thread-adoptive-family-forum/2011/aug/15/separated-their-children-us-policies-
american-fami/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (expressing hope that children’s aid 
organizations can aid in improving the international adoption system).  
175 See Comments to Rubio Blocks Obama’s Nominee for Vietnamese 
Ambassador, THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES,  
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2011/may/23/rubio-blocks-obama-nominee-vietnam-ambassador/ 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (praising Senators Rubio and Lugar for taking 
stances in support of pipeline family unification); see also DRNACHAMA, 
Comment to Government Bars American Family from Contacting Daughter, 
THE WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES, June 21, 2011, 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2011/jun/21/government-bars-american-family-contacting-
daughte/ (demonstrating attempts to gather support for a political petition). 
176 See Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (declaring that participants for the 
event included pipeline parents, children’s aid organizations, and other 
supporters). 
177 See Craig Juntunen, Hurricane Irene Scraps Plans for the Step Forward for 
Orphans March, BOTH ENDS BURNING (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://bothendsburning.org/happening/hurricane-irene-scraps-plans-step-
orphans-march/ (informing readers that the movement’s tentative plan was to re-
schedule for December 2011). 
178 See Step Forward for Orphans March to Tell Story of Children Blocked from 
Joining Families, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20110823005193/en (listing expected participants in the march); see 
also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (asserting that a goal of the march was to 
bring this issue to the attention of the U.S. Department of State which has the 
power to facilitate unification of these pipeline families).  
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adoptions,179 and the march was intended to bring the attention of 
those officials to an issue that has been ongoing for years.180 
 
2. Steps Taken by the U.S. Government 
 
 Despite the outcries from pipeline parents and their 
supporters, the U.S. Department of State has done little to remedy 
the pipeline adoption problem.  In fact, the Department of State has 
further obstructed the process of pipeline adoptions by failing to 
give constructive advice to pipeline families inquiring about the 
completion of their adoptions.181  For example, in late 2010, after 
pipeline parents were told to cease all contact with their children in 
Vietnam, the Department of State advised them to withdraw their 
adoption petitions completely because, as the Department of State 
alleged, the U.S. cannot help to facilitate their adoptions.182  
Further, officials at the Department of State told pipeline families 
they should reapply for adoption in Vietnam after Vietnam ratified 
the Hague Convention,183 completely disregarding the fact that 
these pipeline parents and children had already formed a familial 
bond.  Moreover, the Department of State noted that if Vietnam 
implemented the Hague Convention, any child whose petition was 
withdrawn would be matched with a different family, and pipeline 
parents would lose the opportunity to ever unite with their adopted 
                                                
179 See Hague Convention, supra note 5 (stipulating that Central Authorities can 
take necessary actions to oversee quick adoption measures in countries that are 
parties to the Convention). 
180 See ‘Step Forward for Orphans March’ to Advocate for a Child’s Right to a 
Permanent Family, BUCKNER INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.buckner.org/enews/index.php/2011/08/step-forward-for-orphans-
march/ (quoting Both Ends Burning founder, Craig Juntunen, who stated that his 
goal was to create a social movement that will help spur policy change for 
international adoptions); see also Poe, Step Forward, supra note 97 (expressing 
that the march’s goal was to gain the Department of State’s attention). 
181 See McCarty, supra note 103 (elaborating on the failure of the Department of 
State to give assistance to a pipeline family); see also Poe, Government Bars, 
supra note 12 (criticizing the Department of State for the lack of assistance it 
has been given to the pipeline families). 
182 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADOPTION NOTICE VIETNAM, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.p
hp?alert_notice_type=notices&alert_notice_file=vietnam_2 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2012) (pronouncing that the U.S. Department of State must evaluate Vietnam’s 
adoption program before they are able to facilitate adoptions); see also Poe, 
Government Bars, supra note 12 (indicating that a family was told by the U.S. 
Department of State to withdraw their petition to adopt a child from Vietnam). 
183 See Poe, Government Bars supra note 12; see also Elaine, An Open Letter for 
the Bac Lieu 16, LOOKING FOR GEORGE (June 27, 2011), 
http://lookingforgeorge.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/an-open-letter-for-the-bac-
lieu-16/ (emphasizing that the pipeline parents of the Bac Lieu orphans were 
simply told to reapply after Vietnam ratifies the Hague Convention). 
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children.184  The State Department’s recommendations suggest that 
these orphaned children were somehow interchangeable, and 
pipeline families rightfully refused to follow such ignorant 
advice.185     
Government officials who tried to shed light on the pipeline 
adoption issue have had varying success.  In late 2010, Senator 
John Kerry and House of Representatives member Stephen Lynch, 
along with twenty-three of their Congressional colleagues, sent a 
letter to Secretary of State Clinton urging her to resolve the Nepal 
pipeline cases quickly.186  That letter explained that pipeline 
families are “enduring extreme emotional and financial burdens 
while their children’s cases are investigated further.”187  In a press 
conference, Senator Kerry stated that one pipeline mother from 
Massachusetts is “caught in a snag of international red tape trying 
to do what’s right for her family and for an innocent child in need 
of medical attention . . . She’s played by the rules and our job is to 
help her.”188  Despite the encouraging tone of the letter and speech, 
there is little evidence of any progress on the Nepal pipeline 
adoptions by Secretary of State Clinton or the Congresspeople who 
wrote the letter.189   
Unlike the limited progress made by politicians on the 
pipeline adoptions in Nepal, many parents who were recently 
united with their adopted children from Bac Lieu credit Senators 
Mark Rubio and Richard Lugar.190  In May 2011, Senator Mark 
Rubio placed a hold on the nomination of David Shear for 
                                                
184 See Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (reporting that the child is likely to 
be matched with a new family under the new system of adoptions).  
185 Id. (specifying that a family refused to withdraw the petition, as the State 
Department told them to do).  
186 See Press Release, John Kerry, Urging U.S. State Department to Expedite 
Nepalese Adoptions Already in Progress (Sept. 20, 2010) (on file with author).  
187 Id.  
188 Id. (stating that a child with a cleft pallet was awaiting medical treatment 
available in the U.S.); see also Brady-Myerov, supra note 163 (explaining how a 
mother refuses to abandon her adopted child, although she may lose her job if 
she stays with her child abroad). 
189 See Jessica Dealy, Snag in Nepal Adoptions to US Families, NECN.COM, 
Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.necn.com/09/27/10/Snag-in-Nepal-adoptions-to-US-
families/landing_politics.html?&blockID=3&apID=b8ca6247a3fe44c9a117ffbb
95189ae7 (revealing that as of September 27, 2010, the U.S. government did not 
process any pipeline cases that its adoption website suggested would be 
processed); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Department of 
State Continues to Recommend Against Adopting from Nepal (Aug. 14, 2012) 
(on file with author) (indicating that the U.S. government has not changed its 
position towards Nepalese adoptions). 
190 See Ensslin, supra note 118 (recognizing Senator Lugar and others who took 
action on behalf of pipeline families by placing a hold on President Obama’s 
ambassador nominee); see also Ganote, supra note 134 (indicating a family’s 
recognition that their Vietnamese adoption became official because of Senator 
Lugar’s help).  
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ambassador to Vietnam in an effort to get pipeline families 
information about the status of assistance to their cause.191  Senator 
Rubio’s action followed a hold placed by Senator Richard Lugar 
for similar concerns.192  The senators’ actions were a response to 
the obstacles faced by pipeline families when they tried to gain 
information about their adoption files from the Departments of 
State and Homeland Security.193  One attorney for a pipeline 
family was hopeful that the block would “instill a sense of urgency 
and help the Department of State focus on resolving these cases 
immediately.”194  In addition, one pipeline couple attributed their 
unification with their adopted child to Senator Lugar’s hold which 
prompted the Department of State to get involved.195     
 
IV. Political Suggestions to Help Safely Expedite Pipeline 
Adoptions  
 
Aside from the action of a few politicians, the U.S. 
government has not proposed any potential solutions for the 
pipeline problem created by the Hague Convention.  The 
Department of State has done little beyond encouraging countries 
with pipeline children to ratify and implement the regulations of 
the Hague Convention.196  There is no doubt that the Hague 
                                                
191 See Matthew Pennington, Senate Confirms 1st U.S. Special Envoy to 
Myanmar, New Ambassador to Vietnam, CANADIAN PRESS (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:25 
PM) (reporting that a group of lawmakers blocked David Shear’s nomination as 
Vietnam’s ambassador to challenge adoption delays in Vietnam); see also Poe, 
Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (noting that Senator Rubio placed a hold on 
Shear’s nomination to pressure the government to report the status of pending 
Vietnamese adoptions). 
192 See Lona O’Connor, Local Teacher Takes Adoption Plea to D.C., THE PALM 
BEACH POST (May 29, 2011), available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/ 
news/local-teacher-takes-adoption-plea-to-dc/nLsn2/ (acknowledging that 
Senator Lugar and Senator Rubio’s holds were effective in bringing government 
attention to international adoption issues); see also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra 
note 105. 
193 See Lesley Clark, Marco Rubio Puts a Hold on an Obama Nominee, THE 
MIAMI HERALD (May 23, 2011), available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/ 
nakedpolitics/2011/05/marco-rubio-puts-a-hold-on-an-obama-nominee.html; see 
also Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105.  
194 See Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105 (quoting attorney Kelly Ensslin’s 
belief that the Senators’ holds on Ambassador Shear would propel the 
Department of State to take action on the issue). 
195 See Poe, Happy Ending, supra note 98 (expressing the LeRoy family’s 
appreciation of Senator Lugar’s work bringing attention to the issues of pipeline 
families). 
196 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTINUES TO 
RECOMMEND AGAINST ADOPTING FROM NEPAL, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_alerts_notices.p
hp?alert_notice_type=notices&alert_notice_file=nepal_4 (last visited Oct. 31, 
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Convention is a significant step toward providing parentless 
children homes in an ethical manner.197  However, by prohibiting 
pipeline parents from uniting with their adopted children, the U.S. 
government has inappropriately placed priority on Hague 
Convention regulation over the best interests of the children.198   
More must be done to aid pipeline families, in order to 
satisfy the best interests standard emphasized by the Hague 
Convention.  Thus far, the U.S. government has put forth mediocre 
efforts to rectify the pipeline adoption problem.  Moreover, while 
pipeline parents wait for government action, their adopted children 
continue to languish in sub-standard orphanages.  In light of this 
problem, I argue that the U.S. should aid sending countries while 
they implement the Hague Convention standards.  Furthermore, the 
U.S. should establish bilateral agreements with sending countries 
to expedite pipeline adoptions safely.  Alternatively, the U.S. and 
sending countries should allow for humanitarian parole while 
pipeline adoption paperwork is finalized.   
 
A. The U.S. Should Provide Aid to Sending Countries 
Trying to Implement the Hague Convention 
 
 Because the pipeline adoption issue is predominately an 
American problem,199 the U.S. should use some of its resources to 
help countries implement the Hague Convention regulations in 
order to expedite unification of pipeline parents and their adopted 
children.  Most sending countries are developing countries that 
need financial assistance and time to implement the Hague 
Convention’s standards.200  Moreover, the U.S. has the resources 
and governmental stability to help sending countries develop 
effective laws and adoption systems.201   By relieving some of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
2012) (discussing the U.S.’ attempt to encourage Nepal to adopt the Hague 
Adoption Convention). 
197 McKinney, supra note 1, at 389 (arguing that the Hague Convention is an 
accomplishment for international law because of its declaration that “children 
succeed when raised by stable families”); see also Lynn D. Wardle, 
Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 358 (2005) (recognizing that the Hague 
Convention’s importance in international law is that it formally acknowledges 
that children do better when brought up in a permanent family environment). 
198 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 389 (stating that the Hague Convention’s 
initial goal of protecting the timely placement of orphaned children with 
adoptive families has shifted toward regulation and restriction of international 
adoptions); see also Bartley, supra note 110 (noting that when the U.S. stops 
visas it favors regulation over the “heartache and frustration” of pipeline 
families). 
199 See UNICEF, supra note 3.  
200 See McKinney, supra note 1, at 394–95.  
201 See Troy, supra note 16, at 1546 (stating that the United States would fulfill 
their commitment of making international adoption safer by helping non-
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financial burden required to implement the Hague Convention, 
sending countries could more quickly and efficiently resolve 
pipeline adoptions.  Thus, U.S. assistance would expedite pipeline 
adoptions and make it possible for new adoptions as well.  
Furthermore, help from the U.S. would ensure that pipeline 
adoptions and future adoptions are made using ethical adoption 
practices in accordance with the Hague Convention.   
Although some may argue that U.S. assistance with Hague 
Convention implementation would be paternalistic, this is not the 
case because developing countries have attempted to comply with 
Hague Convention’s standards on their own but have simply 
lacked the resources to do so.  With U.S. help, developing 
countries that wish to comply with the Hague Convention would 
be given the resources to implement the treaty.  Moreover, aid 
would only be necessary during the transitional period from 
signing to ratifying the convention.202  The Hague Convention 
states that signatory countries should collaborate through their 
Central Authorities to establish a system of adoption that complies 
with Hague Convention standards.203  Thus, aid from the U.S. 
would not be an improper imposition on developing countries.  
Rather, it would help other signatories develop adoption practices 
that would facilitate the completion of pipeline adoptions, and 
establish a foundation for developing countries to implement 
Hague Convention standards.   
The U.S. should help sending countries’ complete pipeline 
adoptions by analyzing them on a case-by-case basis, to ensure that 
no unethical practices have occurred.  Such assistance places an 
emphasis on the best interests of the children by expediting 
unification with their adoptive families and providing one last 
safeguard against unethical adoption practices.  Although doing a 
case-by-case analysis will inevitably take more time than simply 
implementing a blanket law delivering pipeline children to their 
parents in the U.S., it will be faster than waiting for sending 
countries to comply with the Hague Convention on their own.   
Although the U.S. should assist sending countries with 
applying the Hague Convention and completing pipeline 
adoptions, the U.S. should have limited enforcement capability.  
Some scholars argue that a body of oversight and enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                       
member sending countries to become members of the Convention); see also 
Worthington, supra note 11, at 585 (indicating that the United States has the 
adequate tools and experience to facilitate a poorer country’s implementation of 
effective adoption systems). 
202 See Wittner, supra note 9, at 617–18 (noting that developing countries 
struggle to ratify the treaty).  
203 See Hague Convention, supra note 5. 
249 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF  [Vol. 3, No. 1 
 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
should be put in place to effectuate lawful adoption procedures.204  
However, that type of overbearing regulation may lead to needless 
tension between the U.S. and sending countries, creating the 
potential for moratoriums on international adoptions.  Moreover, 
sending countries may be unwilling to accept assistance from the 
U.S. if they fear the U.S. will impose penalties or punishments for 
failing to comply with Hague Convention standards.  Thus, the 
U.S. should help sending countries to expedite pipeline adoptions 
and develop ethical adoption practices, but should not act as a 
policing mechanism.  
 
B. The U.S. Should Enter Bilateral Agreements with 
Sending Countries to Expedite Pipeline Adoptions  
 
 By using bilateral agreements, both the U.S. and sending 
countries could agree to standards that would ensure ethical 
adoption practices and safely unite pipeline children with their 
adoptive parents without interfering with implementation of the 
Hague Convention.  Bilateral agreements would expedite pipeline 
adoptions because pipeline parents would not have to wait until the 
sending countries have fully complied with the Hague Convention.  
While some may argue that bilateral agreements would allow 
sending countries to bypass the Hague Convention’s standards,205 
the U.S., as a member of the Hague Convention, would ensure that 
the bilateral agreements contain ethical adoption practices.206  
Thus, bilateral agreements have the potential to expedite pipeline 
adoptions in sending countries that are struggling with 
implementing the Hague Convention in its entirety.   
                                                
204 See Daly, supra note 83, at 628 (arguing that an oversight body should be 
imposed in Guatemala that would comprise of “U.S. State Department officials, 
representatives from accredited American adoption agencies who operate in 
Guatemala, and Guatemalan professionals who currently engage in lawful 
adoption procedures”); see also Ratcliff, supra note 29, at 353–54  (asserting 
that a UN appointed oversight body be created to ensure that the Convention is 
applied correctly and to enforce penalties on countries that have sub-standard 
adoption policies). 
205 See Kimball, supra note 9, at 564 (remarking that intercountry adoptions with 
non-member countries will persist, regardless of whether they ratify and 
implement the Hague Convention); see also Carlberg, supra note 2, at 152 
(suggesting that the bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Vietnam may permit 
Vietnam to side-step implementation of the Hague Convention while still 
allowing adoptions to the U.S.). 
206 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., The Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children (July 13, 
2011) (on file with author) (explaining that the goal of the bilateral adoption 
agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation was to ensure ethical 
adoption practices). 
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In 2005, the U.S. and Vietnam signed a bilateral agreement 
to implement ethical adoption practices and facilitate adoptions 
between the two countries without requiring Hague Convention 
standards.207  The bilateral agreement expired on September 1, 
2008 and there is no expectation to renew it.208  The expiration of 
this bilateral agreement is not indicative of the fate of future 
bilateral agreements on international adoption because the prior 
agreement lacked the specificity necessary for it to be effective.  
The language in the agreement was almost identical to that of the 
Hague Convention, and therefore posed many of the same 
problems.209  Unlike the 2005 treaty between the U.S. and 
Vietnam, the bilateral agreements that I suggest would only relate 
to pipeline adoptions, and would require review of those adoptions 
on a case-by-case basis.  By making the treaties specific, there 
would be greater understanding of their requirements and greater 
potential for their success.   
 While the goal of these bilateral agreements is to unite 
pipeline children with their families, they must also ensure children 
are not subject to unethical adoption practices.  However, because 
many pipeline parents have already met the heightened 
requirements of the Hague Convention, the bilateral agreements 
should permit fulfillment of those requirements to satisfy the check 
against unethical practices.  For example, in many pipeline cases, 
DNA tests have been done to confirm the identity of the children’s 
birth mothers.210  In addition, many pipeline parents have 
paperwork demonstrating that the birth mother of their adopted 
child relinquished her parental rights to that child.211  Under these 
bilateral agreements, such documentation should act as proof of 
ethical adoption practices.  For cases involving pipeline parents 
who cannot produce such documentation, bilateral agreements 
should impose regulations to ensure that the pipeline child was not 
a victim of unethical adoption practices.  Thus, these bilateral 
                                                
207 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children, U.S.-
Viet, June 21, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87188.htm 
(setting forth a section specifically addressing ethical practices). 
208 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADOPTIONS FROM VIETNAM TO THE UNITED 
STATES WILL NOT RESUME WITHOUT A NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT (Oct. 16, 
2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/VietnamFAQ_16oct08.pdf (stating that 
the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Vietnam has expired); see also Ben 
Stocking, U.S.-Vietnam Adoption Pact Ends, Hundreds in Limbo, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-01-
3166225393_x.htm (stating that at the time the agreement expired, the adoption 
program was said to be “suspended indefinitely”). 
209 See Carlberg, supra note 2, at 150. 
210 See Poe, Rubio Blocks, supra note 105. 
211 See id. 
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agreements would both expedite pipeline adoptions and protect 
against unethical adoption practices.    
 
C. Alternatively, the U.S. and Sending Countries Should 
Use Humanitarian Parole while Pipeline Adoption 
Paperwork is Finalized  
 
 If the U.S. and sending countries cannot agree to terms for 
bilateral agreements to expedite pipeline adoptions, humanitarian 
parole212 should be used.  Humanitarian parole would allow 
pipeline children to unite with their adoptive families in the U.S. 
for a specified period of time while their adoption paperwork is 
finalized.213  If during that specified period of time, there was a 
finding of unethical adoption practices with respect to a child, that 
child would be sent back to the sending country.214  However, 
because so many pipeline families have already met requirements 
to prove their adoptions are legitimate,215 the possibility that 
children would be sent back to their countries of origin would be 
slight.  Thus, humanitarian parole would allow pipeline parents 
and children to unite sooner with a low risk of being separated. 
The success of humanitarian parole in pipeline adoption 
cases was demonstrated by its application in 2001 by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) after a moratorium 
was placed on adoptions from Cambodia to the U.S.216  In that 
instance, twelve families were united with their children for two 
                                                
212 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
HUMANITARIAN PAROLE, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ 
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=accc3e4d77d7321
0VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=accc3e4d77d73210VgnVC
M100000082ca60aRCRD (defining humanitarian parole as a device “to bring 
someone who is otherwise inadmissible into the United States for a temporary 
period of time due to a compelling emergency,” and listing the requirements for 
receiving humanitarian parole). 
213 See, e.g., Wittner, supra note 9, at,596 (noting that Cambodian children who 
were granted humanitarian parole were allowed to join new families in the 
United States).  
214 See INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian Orphans, 20/20 (Jan. 18, 2002), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=123957&page= 
1#.TtFr4WNC9Rs. 
215 See, e.g., Poe, Government Bars, supra note 12 (noting that one adoptive 
family spent years receiving adoption approval).  
216 See Wittner, supra note 9, at 596 (acknowledging that the ban on adoptions 
from Cambodia did not affect twelve families who were granted humanitarian 
parole for their adopted children); see also INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian 
Orphans, 20/20 (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/ 
story?id=123957&page=1#.TtFr4WNC9Rs (discussing the INS decision to 
grant humanitarian parole for twelve families). 
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years while their adoption paperwork was finalized.217  While 
those families were grateful to have their adopted children home in 
the U.S., they remained anxious over the unlikely possibility that 
the birth mothers who abandoned their children would come 
forward, requiring the pipeline parents to send their children back 
to Cambodia.218  Because of that stress and the possibility that a 
child may have to return to his or her country of origin, 
humanitarian parole is not preferred over establishing bilateral 
agreements.  However, it is preferable to leaving pipeline children 
in orphanages where their basic needs are not met.  Thus, countries 
that are unable to adopt a bilateral agreement should implement 
humanitarian parole in order to expedite the unification of pipeline 




 While the mission of the Hague Convention is morally 
admirable, its policy to protect the best interests of children in 
international adoption has been thwarted by poor implementation.  
Because many developing countries are incapable of implementing 
the treaty’s heightened requirements, the treaty remains largely 
ineffective.  In addition, the moratoriums on international 
adoptions that resulted from poor implementation of the Hague 
Convention have created serious problems for adoptions that were 
in the pipeline when the bans were put in place.  While the Hague 
Convention was designed to provide a framework for safer 
international adoptions, in practice, it has slowed adoptions and 
caused hundreds of orphaned children to suffer in sub-standard 
orphanages without knowing when or if their adoptive parents will 
come for them.  In an effort to rectify this problem, the U.S. 
government should provide aid for sending countries that are 
trying to implement the Hague Convention.  Moreover, the U.S. 
should establish bilateral agreements with sending countries, or use 
humanitarian parole.  These proposed solutions would expedite the 
unification of pipeline parents and children, and protect against 
corrupt adoption practices, thereby providing for the best interests 
of the pipeline children where the Hague Convention has not.   
 
 
                                                
217 See Wittner, supra note 9, at 596; see also INS Reverses Stance for 
Cambodian Orphans, supra note 217. 
218 See INS Reverses Stance for Cambodian Orphans, supra note 217. 
 
